

Priests, technicians and traders? The discursive politics of Brazil's agricultural cooperation in Mozambique¹

Lidia Cabral

Institute of Development Studies (IDS)
University of Sussex, Reino Unido.
e-mail: l.cabral@ids.ac.uk

Abstract

This paper is situated in an emerging body on Brazilian development cooperation, looking at the specific case of cooperation concerning agricultural development in Africa. The analysis highlights the discursive side of Brazilian cooperation, where competing narratives about models and purposes construct different versions of reality for reasons related to the political character of cooperation. Discourse is hence an expression of the political. This paper frames Brazil's agricultural cooperation as a domain of priests, technicians and traders, driven, respectively, by doctrinal, technical fixing and business rationales. This provides an initial frame of reference to distil actors' narratives about Brazilian cooperation programmes. The paper focuses on two cooperation programmes in Mozambique: ProSAVANA and More Food International. The key for understanding competing narratives on these programmes and how they intermingle and change over time can be found in Brazil's domestic sphere. The two programmes have been interpreted as an expression of contradictions in Brazil's agriculture and particularly its dualistic character, typically framed as family farming *versus* agribusiness. Through the lenses of discourse analysis, this paper offers a critical reading of the interplay between priests, technicians and traders, as shaped by different interests and points of view in cooperation relations.

Keywords: Brazilian cooperation; ProSAVANA; More Food International; Mozambique; discourse politics.

Sacerdotes, técnicos e investidores? A política discursiva da cooperação agrícola brasileira em Moçambique

Resumo

Este artigo enquadra-se num corpo emergente de literatura sobre a cooperação brasileira para o desenvolvimento, olhando para o caso concreto da cooperação agrícola na África. A análise destaca a natureza discursiva da cooperação brasileira, onde narrativas concorrentes sobre os modelos e motivações da cooperação constroem versões diferentes da realidade, por razões que dizem respeito ao caráter político da cooperação. O discurso é assim uma expressão de política. Segundo uma perspectiva, a cooperação agrícola brasileira é um domínio de sacerdotes, técnicos e comerciantes, motivados, respetivamente por razões ideológicas, tecnocráticas e comerciais. Esta perspectiva fornece um quadro de referência inicial para destilar as narrativas dos atores acerca dos programas brasileiros de cooperação. O artigo debruça-se sobre dois programas concretos em Moçambique: o ProSAVANA e o Mais Alimentos Internacional. É na esfera doméstica brasileira que se pode encontrar a chave para interpretar as diferentes narrativas acerca destes programas e compreender de que forma essas narrativas se relacionam e alteram ao longo do tempo. Os dois programas têm sido interpretados como manifestação das contradições da agricultura

¹ This research was supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council's 'Rising Powers and Interdependent Futures' programme (www.risingpowers.net).

brasileira e, em particular, do seu caráter dual, frequentemente expresso como agricultura familiar *versus* agronegócio. Tendo como referencial teórico a análise de discurso, o artigo fornece uma leitura crítica do relacionamento entre sacerdotes, técnicos e comerciantes, ou das diferentes motivações presentes nas relações de cooperação.

Palavras-chave: Cooperação brasileira; ProSAVANA; Mais Alimentos Internacional; Moçambique; análise de discurso.

¿Sacerdotes, técnicos e inversores? La política discursiva de la cooperación agrícola de Brasil en Mozambique

Resumen

Este artículo es parte de un cuerpo emergente de la literatura sobre la cooperación brasileña para el desarrollo, mirando el caso de la cooperación agrícola en África. El análisis pone de manifiesto la naturaleza discursiva de la cooperación brasileña, donde compiten narrativas sobre los modelos y las motivaciones de la cooperación construyen diferentes versiones de la realidad, por motivos relacionados con el carácter político de la cooperación. Lo discurso es por tanto una expresión política. Según una perspectiva, la cooperación agrícola brasileña es un dominio de sacerdotes, técnicos y comerciantes, impulsados, respectivamente, por razones ideológicas, tecnocráticas y comerciales. Este enfoque proporciona un marco inicial para la destilación de las narrativas de los actores sobre los programas de cooperación de Brasil. El artículo se centra en dos programas específicos en Mozambique: ProSAVANA e Mais Alimentos Internacional. Es en la esfera doméstica brasileña que se puede encontrar la clave para interpretar las diferentes narrativas acerca de estos programas. Los dos programas se han interpretado como una manifestación de las contradicciones de la agricultura brasileña y, en particular, su carácter dual, expresado a menudo como la agricultura familiar frente a la agroindustria. mas y entender cómo se relacionan estas narrativas y cambian con el tiempo. Teniendo como referencial teórico el análisis del discurso, el artículo proporciona un análisis crítico de la relación entre sacerdotes, técnicos y comerciantes, o presentes motivaciones diferentes en las relaciones de cooperación.

Palabras clave: Cooperación brasileña; ProSAVANA; Mais Alimentos Internacional; Mozambique; análisis del discurso.

Introduction

Brazil's insertion in the realm of international development cooperation is a relatively recent phenomenon and one that has been getting significant attention by researchers and practitioners. Often clustered with China and India as a rising power or as a BRICS country, Brazil's South-South cooperation has been widely discussed and contrasted with the cooperation practices of other countries, not least those in the OECD (CABRAL et al. 2014; BURGES 2013; PINO 2010; PINO and LEITE 2009).

Brazilian cooperation is commonly understood to be a legacy of President Lula da Silva's government, who prioritised South-South alliances on the basis of geostrategic motivations (PINHEIRO 2012; MALAMUD 2011; VIGEVANI and CEPALUNI 2007; SOARES DE LIMA and HIRST 2006). The Brazilian government often highlights the horizontal nature

of its cooperation and distinguished it from so-called 'traditional Northern-South' cooperation (ABREU 2013: 13). Like other South-South cooperation providers, the Brazilian government's official discourse refrains from using the terms 'aid' or 'assistance', regarded as associated with vertical cooperation relationships of traditional donors (ibid).

In Africa, Brazilian cooperation has often been packaged in a discourse of altruism and 'southern solidarity' (VISENTINI 2009). Yet, as Brazilian businesses expand their footprint across the continent, the morally grounded discourse begins to fade. President Dilma Rousseff has taken a less passionate and more pragmatic stance, emphasising mutual benefit in Brazil's relations with Africa. The motivations for Brazilian cooperation and the links between cooperation and business are hence being interrogated, particularly with regards to agriculture, an area that has become particularly sensitive in Africa in the light of debates on land grabbing and natural resource exploitation (BUSH et al. 2011).

Questions such as whose interests drive Brazil into Africa's agriculture, what agricultural development models are carried along and what is in them for African countries, particularly their most deprived populations, have been guiding research and debates on Brazilian cooperation. ProSAVANA, a partnership between the governments of Brazil, Mozambique and Japan for the development of agriculture in a northern region of the Mozambican savannah, has been at the centre of those debates. The programme has been heavily criticised for favouring a production system based on the monoculture of commodities and aiming mainly at export markets, which is seen as inadequate to respond to the needs of local communities and is accused of serving the interests of corporate agribusiness (SCHLESINGER 2014; CLEMENTS and FERNANDES 2013). The critique suggests an alternative based on Brazil's public policies supporting family farming systems, regarded as more suitable to the African context.

Those working directly on the programme, such as researchers from the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation, Embrapa, reject both the critique and the alternative. One Embrapa researcher noted: 'We are not priests. We are just the technicians, sent by the traders'. In his account, priests are associated with those advocating a family farming paradigm and regarded as ideologically driven. Traders are those with an eye on the opportunities cooperation in Mozambique offered to Brazilian businesses. Technicians are those who, as the Embrapa researcher, are only motivated by the technical dimension of the cooperation exchange. This account is also a self-critical recognition that the technical input may in effect be at the service of a business agenda, as suggested by the 'sent by the traders' remark.

Yet, this paper is not about unveiling the 'truth' about Brazil's development cooperation and its drivers. The analytical approach taken discards the idea that one real story about Brazil's cooperation exists. Instead, the analysis seeks to highlight the discursive

character of the cooperation policy process by illustrating how different versions of reality are constructed through discourse (JØRGENSEN and PHILLIPS 2002). The competing narratives on Brazil's agricultural cooperation that this paper documents are not taken simply as manipulations of the 'truth' but as evidence of how development cooperation is experienced by different actors who are engaged in hegemonic struggles to frame reality in particular ways (LACLAU and MOUFFE 1985). The paper borrows the priests-technicians-traders framing as a basis for discussing the conflicting narratives and how they intermingle and change over time.

Discourse on Brazil's agricultural cooperation is captured through the narrative accounts of Brazilian actors concerning Brazilian agriculture and agricultural cooperation initiatives abroad. These accounts were collected through qualitative interviews conducted by the author in Brazil and in Mozambique, between November 2013 and August 2014. The focus lies on Brazil's agricultural cooperation in Mozambique and specifically two programmes: ProSAVANA and More Food International (MFI). The choice of Mozambique is justified by the relative significance and variety of Brazilian agricultural cooperation initiatives that the country hosts. The selection of programmes reflects such variety and serves the purpose of connecting Brazil's cooperation experience with its domestic political context.

ProSAVANA and MFI have been interpreted as an expression of the contradictions in Brazilian agriculture and particularly its dualistic character, seen in the institutional set up for governing the sector – the two programmes are led by different agriculture sector institutions in Brazil – and the political dispute between two dominant agriculture sector lobbies: family farming and agribusiness. The paper illustrates how the dualism narrative is replicated, contested and reframed by discourse concerning Brazil's agricultural cooperation in Mozambique. The Embrapa researcher's caricature could in effect be viewed as a particular framing of dualism where priests and traders stand on opposite sides and where technicians play a subsidiary role, at the service of traders.

Overall, the paper offers two general contributions to the growing body of research on Brazil's development cooperation. One is to illustrate the discursive nature of cooperation policy-making, where narratives should not be taken at face value but interpreted on the basis of multifaceted social relations and power dynamics. The other is to ground the discussion on Brazil's international cooperation within the country's domestic politics, where, it is argued, the key for deciphering those dynamics lies.

The following section provides some background on Brazilian agriculture and its internationalisation process as a means of contextualising the analysis and shedding light onto the priests-technicians-traders caricature. Next, the two case studies are situated within Brazil's agricultural cooperation portfolio in Mozambique. ProSAVANA and MFI, with their discursive manifestations, are then analysed in detail, respectively. The priests-technicians-

traders framing is also considered in relation to the two programmes. The final section concludes and raises questions for further analysis.

Priests, technicians and traders in the context of Brazilian agriculture and its internationalisation

In the Embrapa respondent's framing, priests, technicians and traders stand, respectively, for ideological, technical and business orientations in Brazil's development cooperation. As the case-study analysis in this paper illustrates, this discursive triad is a useful caricature of a domain populated by contrasting interests and perspectives on agriculture and on what development cooperation entails. But to better understand where the caricature comes from, it is necessary to consider: first, Brazil's agricultural context and, specifically, the terms of the debate family farming-*versus*-agribusiness; and second, the wider process of internationalisation of Brazilian agriculture.

Brazilian agriculture, policy framework and dualism

Brazilian agriculture is mostly known for its high-earning commodities. The country has, over a period of about 30 years, modernised its agriculture and turned into a 'global agricultural powerhouse' (WHEATLEY 2010), placing itself amongst the three world leading producers and exporters of sugar, chicken, orange juice, soybean, coffee, sugar, ethanol and tobacco (PEREIRA et al. 2012). Many of these successful commodities are produced in large, highly-mechanised farms found in the high plains of central Brazil, the *Cerrado* region, Brazil's savannah-like biome (WHEATLEY 2010).

Brazilian agriculture is not just about large, mechanised and export-oriented farming found in the *Cerrado*. According to the 2006 Census, about 4.36 million farms, with an average size of 18ha, represent 84.4 percent of total farming units (IBGE 2009). They are classified as 'family farms', following a definition institutionalised in 2006, based on criteria related to farm size, sources of labour and income.² These farms account for the bulk of production of some of Brazil's main food items, such as beans, cassava and milk (FRANÇA et al. 2009). They are claimed to play a major role in addressing domestic food needs and employing the labour force (77 percent of people working in agriculture), despite benefiting from a disproportionately low share of land (24 percent) (CASTRO 2013: 11-12) and public

² Four criteria have been established to define a family farm (stipulated by the law number 11.326/2006): (i) property farmed not larger than four fiscal modules in size; (ii) predominant use of labour provided by the landowner's own family; (iii) family income mainly sourced from activities associated with the farm; and (iv) management of the farm carried out by the family.

resources,³ when compared to the non-family sector. Despite the international image of success, typically associated with the *Cerrado*, inequality in resource distribution and land and income concentration remains a distinctive feature of Brazil's rural landscape.

The contrast between large and small farms and between agribusiness (often equated with large scale, highly capitalised and export-oriented farms) and family farms (of small to medium scale and more oriented to the domestic market) is a constant element in debates about agricultural development, inequality and public policy. Some describe the sector as governed by 'agrarian dualism', where two agricultural ministries coexist to serve two farming systems: the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA) supports agribusiness and the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) supports family farming (PIERRI 2013). Such dualism is also framed as a 'Gramscian struggle for hegemony' between two ideologically opposing development models (as discussed in CABRAL and SHANKLAND 2013: 18). From this perspective, agribusiness is criticised for concentrating resources and income and for negative environmental impacts. Family farming is associated with food production and a more environmentally balanced and socially just agrarian structure (FERNANDES et al. 2012).

The definitions of what constitutes family farming and agribusiness are, however, contested and the use of the terms is in itself part of the debate. For some, the dualism argument is a manichaeistic caricature of Brazilian agriculture, lacking conceptual and empirical foundation and being largely driven by political calculation (NAVARRO and PEDROSO 2011; NAVARRO 2010; GRAZIANO DA SILVA 1980). Agribusiness is not necessarily separate from or inimical to family farming, as family farms are often integrated in value chains that connect farm production with processing and marketing activities (SILVA 2010). Dualism proponents counter-argue, however, that '[r]epresenting agribusiness as a totality – i.e. everyone is a farmer – is a strategy used by advocates of the agrarian capitalism paradigm to hide inequalities generated by rural power relations' (FERNANDES et al. 2012: 37).

Notwithstanding this debate and the conceptual validity of the terms, the coexistence of two agricultural ministries, led by two different political parties in the governing coalition,⁴ confirms the idea of dualistic governance. This division is also reflected in Congress where there is an opposition between the two prominent agricultural political lobbies – the *bancada ruralista* and the Workers Party's (PT) *núcleo agrário*.⁵ Reflecting the institutional and political arrangements, the recent history of Brazil's agricultural policy is

³ In the 2014/15 Crop Plan, the family farming sector was allocated 20bn Reais and the non-family farming sector 150bn Reais (FAVARETO 2014a: 9).

⁴ MAPA has been traditionally led by the Brazilian Democratic Movement's Party (PMDB) and MDA by the Workers Party (PT), and particularly the PT's internal social democracy current.

⁵ Interview with MDA respondent 1 (Brasília, November 2014).

marked by two largely separate trajectories: one that led to the emergence of Brazil's modern farming sector and another that institutionalised the family farming category and developed a set of policies targeting this particular group.

The origins of Brazil's modern agriculture are usually situated in the 1960s when the combination of a particular context (of rapid industrialisation and expansion in transport infrastructure) and a set of agricultural policies (which included public research, rural extension and credit) created the conditions for the development of a dynamic sector (BUAINAIN et al. 2013; PEREIRA et al. 2012). The circumstances and policies led to the formation of the capitalist modern farmer, who emerged largely from a group of migrant farmers from the South of the country attracted to lower latitudes, and the *Cerrado* in particular, by the expansion of the agricultural frontier.⁶ Over the years, favourable macroeconomic management and growing international demand for agricultural commodities, particularly China's demand for soybeans, created the conditions for the expansion of Brazil's export-oriented sector.

Policies directed to the family farming segment received unprecedented attention since 2003, when the PT became the dominant political force in the ruling coalition. MDA's budget increased significantly over the years – its main policy instrument, the National Programme for Strengthening Family Farming (PRONAF), a credit facility, expanded about eightfold between 2002/03 and 2010/11 (from 2.4 to 16bn Reais) (MDA 2010: 23). PRONAF's scope was also enlarged to include rural extension to farmers and new family farming policies were created, including insurance, price guarantees and public procurement. Two programmes, which would later become references in international cooperation, are worth highlighting from this package: the More Food Programme and the Food Purchase Programme (known as PAA). The former provides credit to assist the 'modernisation of family farms', where modernisation is used as a synonym of mechanisation (MDA 2010: 58). The latter is a social welfare programme that guarantees public procurement from targeted family farmers, and channels the acquired products to food security and nutrition programmes, including the National School Feeding Programme, known as *Merenda Escolar*.

Brazil's recent agricultural policy history and the country's agrarian structure legacy combined have given rise, according to FAVARETO (2014a; 2013), to a complex social reality in the rural sphere, for which the author offers a more nuanced reading of the agribusiness-family farming divide. In Favareto's formulation, agribusiness includes both backward and modern large farms. The former are those who inherited land and are linked to

⁶ The movement of the agricultural frontier to lower latitudes is regarded as mainly a contribution from public research, and from Embrapa specifically, which allowed the adaptation of many temperate-climate crops, including soybean, to tropical conditions (PEREIRA et al. 2012).

Brazil's traditional oligarchies; they have a high degree of political power but low levels of technical modernisation and productivity. The latter are modern farms with high levels of productivity and income. Family farms are seen as including modern and mechanised farms with high productivity, farms highly dependent on MDA's subsidies and a peripheral segment (including landless people) dependent on social welfare policies.

This more nuanced disaggregation of the sector is useful to further unpack the notions of agribusiness and family farming and see where the two might overlap. One could argue that the difference between modern family farms and modern agribusinesses is more of scale than of any fundamental distinction in their social organisation of production.

The disaggregation also suggests that the terms of the paradigmatic dispute may no longer be reflected by the agribusiness-family farming dualism (as the overlaps may indeed suggest). Another type of paradigmatic fracture is concealed in current debates. It concerns how agriculture and the rural spheres are conceptualised. The contrast is between a 'productivist' focus on performance of agricultural activity (as the central locus of production and exchange) vis-à-vis an emphasis on the rural space as 'territories of life' that takes into account a more heterogeneous set of social relations beyond the primary sector's performance (FAVARETO 2014a).

The 'productivist' paradigm is reflected in arguments suggesting that without incentives to boost efficiency small farms (measured in terms of value of production rather than area) are doomed to disappear, because they are unable to compete in increasing competitive markets, and that Brazilian agriculture will gradually become dominated by large scale and highly efficient farms (BUAINAIN et al. 2013). The 'territories of life' perspective argues that public policies cannot be framed solely in terms of addressing productive efficiency but in terms of maintaining the social fabric in rural areas and promoting diversity of the natural and social landscape (FAVARETO 2014b).

In this reinterpretation of dualism, the institutional divide between MAPA and MDA may no longer reflect the terms of the paradigm dispute, as parts of MAPA and MDA may share allegiances to either a 'productivist' or a 'territories of life' type of perspective. Hence, for example, although MDA's political discourse emphasises family farming as a production system distinct from agribusiness, its More Food Programme has been criticised for promoting the 'conservative modernisation' of family farms, through the use of an agribusiness technological package which leads to the specialisation of production, increases dependency on large agroindustrial conglomerates and thereby compromises the model's sustainability (TEIXEIRA 2013; IBASE 2006). On the other hand, within Embrapa (a public corporation institutionally subordinated to MAPA), a current sympathetic to an agroecological approach to farming and emphasising diversity of rural systems seems to be

gaining ground against a more traditional emphasis on high-tech extensive farming (CABRAL forthcoming).

This historical trajectory of Brazilian agriculture and recent policy debates – where the existence of dualism and its nature are contested – are reflected in the practices of cooperation abroad, as the following sections will illustrate by reference to two cooperation programmes in Mozambique. Before that, an overview of the process of internationalisation of Brazilian agriculture in its various dimensions provides additional background to the case-study analysis.

The internationalisation of Brazilian agriculture: priests, technicians and traders in Africa

The internationalisation of Brazilian agriculture has happened mainly through its export sector. But besides agricultural commodities, other aspects of Brazilian agriculture are increasingly crossing the border. There is some investment in farming activity overseas, there are political networking and advocacy activities in international fora, and there is the sharing of agricultural technology and know-how as part of conventional development cooperation activities. As this paper will suggest, Brazil's development cooperation is not simply about the latter but is connected to this wider process of internationalisation. For the moment, however, and for the sake of scene setting, it worth contextualising briefly some of these various transnational endeavours. Borrowing the Embrapa researcher's caricature, the remainder of this section will situate the 'traders', 'priests' and 'technicians' in the context of the internationalisation of Brazilian agriculture, in the African continent specifically.

Traders – the business drive

Investments by Brazilian private entrepreneurs in agricultural production in Africa are still relatively confined. The best-known case is the cotton farm explored by the Pinesso Group, from Brazil's Mato Grosso state, in Sudan. Pinesso is also present in northern Mozambique, where it grows soybean and cotton. Odebretch, one of Brazil's largest construction companies, is also investing in the farming sector in Angola. Through these experiences, it is modern agriculture of the type that flourished in the Brazilian *Cerrado* that is being exported. The Pinesso Group, for example, holds a concession of 100,000ha in Sudan (ONDEI 2013). Paulo Hegg, one of the Group's partners, described modern farming practiced in Sudan as 'an industrial assembly line', where cutting edge machinery and transgenic seeds have been deployed to boost productivity (HEGG 2014: 17-20). Unsurprisingly, it is the large entrepreneurs who are able to mobilise the required capital for

overseas investments and have the leverage to influence local governments for favourable conditions.⁷

But despite growing concern with the involvement of Brazilian entrepreneurs in land grabbing in Africa (UNAC et al. 2012), Brazil's agribusiness investments remain largely episodic. Land may be cheaper in Africa, but the high levels of risk and scarcity of financial incentives still restrain Brazilian entrepreneurs. The latter's interest in farming in Africa is however patent⁸ and there is an expectation that further investment opportunities will be promoted by the Brazilian government, especially now that the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) has a branch in South Africa.⁹

Brazilian business' interest in African agriculture concerns not only farming but also complementary activities, such as selling agricultural machinery and equipment, an area BNDES seems keen to promote.¹⁰ Besides expanding markets for the Brazilian industry, the latter also contributes to enhancing local farming conditions, thereby making future investments in production more viable than at present circumstances.¹¹

Priests – the political drive

Besides modern large-scale farming, other Brazilian farming models and experiences have also gained international exposure. The family farming concept and associated public policies have permeated international fora through MDA's policy networking activities. An interviewed MDA official, highlighted the creation, in 2003, of the Specialised Meeting on Family Farming (REAF) within the institutional structures of Mercosul (a regional trading bloc in South America) as a milestone in promoting family farming abroad and in involving civil society actors in international policy debates concerning Brazilian agriculture.¹² Although REAF does not concern Africa specifically, by actively engaging in it, MDA would over the years build an international arm that would later become connected with Africa through development cooperation.

Brazil's family farming narrative has also gained significant international visibility under the current leadership of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). FAO's Director-General, José Graziano, a former minister in President Lula's government, has made family farming one of FAO's central themes.¹³

⁷ In Sudan, for example, the Pinesso Group successfully lobbied the Sudanese authorities to pass a bill in Parliament authorising the introduction of transgenic cotton seeds into the country (HEGG 2014).

⁸ The Second Brazil-Africa Forum, an event focused largely on business opportunities in Africa, illustrates the interest by Brazil's agribusiness sector. The event, held in Fortaleza in August 2014, featured a dedicated session on Brazilian agribusiness in Africa.

⁹ As expressed by some of the participants at the Second Brazil-Africa Forum.

¹⁰ Interview with BNDES respondent (Fortaleza, August 2014).

¹¹ Interview with FGV respondent 2 (telephone interview, August 2014).

¹² Interview with MDA respondent 3 (Brasília, November 2013).

¹³ For example, 2014 was celebrated as the United Nations' year for family farming under José Graziano's leadership.

Brazil's civil society actors have also played a part in exposing internationally aspects of their country's agricultural experience, either by participating in policy fora such as REAF or through their own connections to international networks. For example, the Landless Rural Workers' Movement (MST), connected to international networks through Via Campesina, an international peasant's movement, has been actively engaged in sharing Brazil's social mobilisation experience in agriculture and exposing the dark side of the *Cerrado* success story (NOGUEIRA 2013).

Technicians – the technical fixing drive

Technical cooperation projects are the main channel for sharing Brazil's agricultural technology and know-how and Embrapa is the leading, though not exclusive, actor. Technical cooperation activities typically combine training, crop adaptation and other farming experiments in beneficiary countries involving Embrapa's researchers. In Africa, Embrapa is represented in technical cooperation projects in some 16 countries.¹⁴

Embrapa's technological contribution to the transformation of the *Cerrado* and the emergence of modern Brazilian agriculture (Arraes et al. 2012) is central to its dominant narrative of cooperation in Africa. This narrative highlights similarities between the Brazilian *Cerrado* and the African savannah that justify common technological solutions (Embrapa 2010). Yet, the experience of Embrapa professionals in cooperation reveals a more nuanced picture. Embrapa has over its 40 years of existence grown into a complex organisation inside Brazil. Today it covers a wide range of agricultural production systems and hosts contrasting epistemological traditions. Some of its current researchers are critical about, and disengaged with, the organisation's historical connection with the *Cerrado* development (NAVARRO and ALVES 2014). As discussed elsewhere (CABRAL forthcoming), the diversity of thinking about agricultural development found within Embrapa today is reflected in its researchers' engagements in technical cooperation abroad.

Overall, the internationalisation of Brazilian agriculture is happening across several fronts, through interactions involving businessmen, politicians, bureaucrats, researchers and activists. Different visions and models of agricultural development, which can ultimately be translated into some form of dualism, are promoted through these various forms of engagement.

The technical fixing thrust of development cooperation is hardly immune from the political game fought at home. Embrapa's technicians may have been initially sent by the traders but, as this paper suggests, the priests' response is taking shape. The remainder of the paper discusses the connection between these various interactions with reference to the two selected cooperation projects in Mozambique.

¹⁴ Source: www.embrapa.br/cooperacao-tecnica

Overview of Brazil's agricultural cooperation in Mozambique

Mozambique is a top priority in Brazil's foreign policy and private investments in Africa (STOLTE 2012) as it is also a top destination of Brazil's development cooperation in Africa and currently concentrates a variety of initiatives in the agriculture sector (CABRAL and SHANKLAND 2013). The significance of the agricultural portfolio within cooperation as a whole is reflected in the creation, by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC),¹⁵ of an exceptional in-country coordination function for agriculture-related projects.¹⁶

Agriculture is a strategic sector in the Mozambican economy, accounting for 33 percent of GDP in 2012 and employing 70 percent of the population (AfDB, OECD and UNDP 2014). With 36 million hectares of arable land and only 10 percent being annually cultivated, the potential for agricultural expansion is considered very significant (MINAG 2011). Furthermore, the country's geographic position, between landlocked countries and ocean ports strategically located vis-à-vis Asian markets, also makes it a very attractive destination for foreign direct investments in agriculture. Mozambique was indeed the country of choice of Brazil and Japan for their food security initiative in Africa, an outcome of the L'Aquila Food Summit in 2009 (see section 4.1 on this issue). It is, therefore, unsurprising that agriculture has become so prominent in Brazilian cooperation activities

At the time this research was conducted, Brazil's technical cooperation portfolio for agriculture in Mozambique comprised six projects, summarised in Table 1. They constitute an assorted package in terms of focus, institutions involved and agricultural role models. Training and capacity building activities, led by Embrapa and directed to its homologous local agricultural research institution, Mozambique's Agrarian Research Institute (IIAM), have been the dominant form of cooperation. ProSAVANA, ProAlimentos and Plataforma all aim to strengthen IIAM's research capacity. This Embrapa-dominated portfolio has recently expanded to include projects focused on policy dialogue, entailing the sharing of Brazil's experiences with public policy targeting the family farming sector. PAA-Africa and MFI are the two examples of this. There is also one project connecting Brazilian and Mozambican farmers' organisations to promote native seeds' conservation.

This study selected ProSAVANA and MFI as case studies for detailed analysis. ProSAVANA is the Programme for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savannah in Mozambique, developed in partnership with the governments of Mozambique and Japan, and aiming to strengthen the potential of agriculture in the Nacala Corridor region, in the

¹⁵ ABC is the unit within the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for the coordination of technical cooperation.

¹⁶ This function has been performed by a contracted consultant who has been based in Mozambique (CHICHAVA et al. 2013).

north of Mozambique. Edaphoclimatic affinities between the Brazilian *Cerrado* and the Mozambican savannah are evoked to justify the suitability of Brazilian technology and expertise (LEITE and SILVA 2013). MFI is inspired by Brazil's More Food Programme, the family farming focused mechanisation policy.¹⁷ It combines policy dialogue, rural extension activities and a concessional credit scheme to support acquisitions by African farmers of Brazilian-made agricultural machinery and equipment. The programme targets small and medium farmers and aims to increase productivity and ultimately address food security.

Table 1. Brazil's agricultural cooperation portfolio in Mozambique in 2014.

Project	Timeframe	Stated aims	Mozambican counterpart	Brazilian institutions officially involved	Brazilian agriculture role models
ProSAVANA	2011-2021	'Create new models of agriculture development, taking into account environmental and socio-economic aspects, aiming regional agriculture and rural development oriented towards the market and with competitive advantages.' (GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE et al. 2013a)	IIAM	Embrapa, FGV, MDA, ABC	<i>Cerrado</i> development
ProAlimentos	2011-2014	'Strengthen strategic production and distribution capacities regarding food products in Mozambique.' (ABC 2011: 9)	IIAM	Embrapa	Embrapa's research on horticultures
Plataforma	2010-2014	'Strengthen the national system of agricultural research in Mozambique, aiming to have efficient planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of agricultural research activities and dissemination of agricultural technology.' (ABC 2010a: 4)	IIAM	Embrapa	Embrapa's institutional structure and research capacity
More Food International	2014-2016	'Transfer, absorption and/or development of specific knowledge and selling of machinery and equipment.' (GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL 2013: Art. 2º I)	Agricultural Development Fund (FDA)	MDA, Embrapa, Brazil's rural extension agencies to be defined	More Food Programme
PAA-Africa	2012-2015	'1- Support innovative local initiatives of food purchase from smallholders for humanitarian food assistance; 2- Strengthen partnerships and strategies to support long-term solutions to fighting hunger through local food purchase initiatives for food assistance.' (PAA 2013)	Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG)	MDS and CG Fome ¹⁸	Food Purchase Programme (PAA)
Native seeds conservation	2011-2014	'Promote and support the exchange, dissemination and commercialisation of traditional/native seeds, through seed fairs and exchange of experiences.' (GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL undated)	MINAG, National Peasants' Union (UNAC)	General Secretariat of the Presidency, Brazilian social movements ¹⁹	Social movements' experiences with conservation agriculture

¹⁷ The More Food Programme is in operation since 2008 as part of PRONAF and it supplies subsidised technologies and implements to Brazilian family farmers.

¹⁸ These are, respectively, the Ministry of Social Development and the Coordination-General for International Actions Against Hunger of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁹ These include Movimento das Mulheres Camponesas (MMC) and Movimento dos Pequenos Agricultores (MPA).

This selection does not intend to be representative of Brazil's agricultural cooperation portfolio in Mozambique but to provide a basis for exploring the issue of how domestic politics in a donor country permeates development cooperation discourse and to what effect. More specifically, it allows us to explore the polarisation concerning models of agricultural development. As one respondent put it, Mozambique is 'the lab of the difficult combination between systems of production'.²⁰

ProSAVANA and its discursive politics

Genesis

The idea behind ProSAVANA got an official stamp at the 2009 L'Aquila Summit, where the Brazilian President, Lula da Silva, and the Japanese Prime Minister, Taro Aso, agreed to build on their countries' experience of bilateral cooperation in the Brazilian *Cerrado* – Prodecer²¹ – to support agricultural development in Mozambique as part of their contributions to the food security initiative announced at the Summit (JICA et al. 2009). Much of Mozambique's arable land lies on Africa's Guinean Savannah zone, a vast area spreading along the tropics belt where a 'sleeping giant' of agriculture-based prosperity, based on improved international commercial competitiveness of a handful of crops, was argued to be waiting to be awoken (MORRIS et al. 2009). The 'sleeping giant' thesis, published as a joint World Bank-FAO report earlier that year, presented the Brazilian *Cerrado's* experience of large-scale and highly mechanised production as one of two successful prototypes for the region (the other was Thailand's smallholder-based development).

ProSAVANA's exact parentage is subject to speculation but one of the earliest references to it dates back to 2005 when the then Director-President of Embrapa, Clayton Campanhola, announced a new technical cooperation initiative in Mozambique to be carried out as a partnership with the Brazilian mining company Vale. Vale had just obtained a concession for a coal mine in the north of the country (RÁDIO NACIONAL 2005). In a 2013 press conference, Vale's CEO, Murilo Ferreira, recalled the original connection between Vale's investments (in the Moatize coal mine as well as the railway line transporting the coal to the nearest port at Nacala) and the *Cerrado*-inspired technical cooperation project envisioned for the Nacala Corridor by the Minister of Agriculture of Lula's first government, Roberto Rodrigues.

²⁰ Interview with CSO respondent 1 (Brasília, November 2013).

²¹ Prodecer was a cooperation initiative between Brazil and Japan in the *Cerrado*, carried out between the 1970s and the 1990s, which is claimed to have turned Brazil into a leading world exporter of agricultural commodities (HOSONO and HONGO 2012).

In my first visit to Mozambique as president I noticed a slightly heavy climate in relation to the railway because it was going to be dedicated to transporting coal. In that same day the President spoke to me showing interest in opening the railway to any business. That it could transport any type of cargo, grains, fertilizer, anything. In the afternoon of the same day, we went to inaugurate Beira's port, which was a port which was going to operate temporarily for us, while Nacala [port] was not ready. There I said, in my salute to the President, improvising, that the railway would have open access. The ex-minister [of agriculture in Brazil] Roberto Rodrigues had very beautiful plans, in which the Brazilian Cerrado ... Here you are all too young, you do not know that Brazil in the 70s did not produce anything in the Brazilian Cerrado. And today it is the breadbasket that we all know. There it looks very much like our Cerrado. So our ex-minister is doing the ProSAVANA project and I am sure that there is enough land to make that country plentiful of food and become a great food exporter.' (VALE 2013: 1-2).

Four years later, the Brazilian government found in Japan an ideal partner to replicate the *Cerrado* enterprise and imprint dynamism in a region where Brazilian companies were starting to get established – Vale pulled along several Brazilian medium sized enterprises providing services to the mining company²² and Odebrecht would later obtain a concession for upgrading the Nacala airport.²³ In September 2009, the government of Mozambique, Brazil and Japan finally signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the Triangular Cooperation for the Development of Agriculture in the Mozambican Tropical Savannahs (JICA et al. 2009).

As far as the Brazilian side of cooperation was concerned, besides the seemingly altruistic sharing of tropical agricultural technology with the '*irmãos africanos*' (African brothers),²⁴ commercially-minded motivations had also been pointed out by the Embrapa leadership in the early days:

...besides technical support given to beneficiary countries, [technical cooperation agreements] open way to Brazilian suppliers of agricultural products, such as seed. They also open, for Embrapa, access to international research funding lines for research and technical initiatives for the development and production of food in poor and developing countries. (VALOR ECONÔMICO 2004).

Furthermore, it was noted that 'the dissemination of technology from Embrapa and Brazilian scientists can increase the country's revenue, via royalties' (*Ibid*). ProSAVANA, with its long-term 20-year horizon and relatively sizeable budget for Brazilian cooperation standards – an estimated budget of \$36m (NOGUEIRA and OLLINAHO 2013) – therefore offered not only considerable visibility to Brazil's African diplomacy through technical

²² Interview with Vale respondent (Maputo, February 2014).

²³ Japan, on the other hand, had its interests too (FUNADA-CLASSEN 2013).

²⁴ Campanhola interview (RÁDIO NACIONAL 2005).

cooperation but also a convenient opportunity to address the expectations of a burgeoning business sector with growing international ambitions.

Against this background, ProSAVANA was presented as a ‘win-win-win’ trilateral partnership aiming to replicate the success of the *Cerrado* in Mozambique’s Nacala Corridor region (JICA and ORIENTAL CONSULTANTS 2011; KUMASHIRO and PAIVA 2011). The similarities between areas located within the same latitude parallels were highlighted to justify the suitability of Brazilian tropical agriculture technology to the Mozambican savannah (LEITE and SILVA 2013; MOURÃO 2011). Furthermore, the Prodecex experience between Brazil and Japan offered a ready-made template for intervention. Figure 1, frequently used in official presentations about the programme, illustrates the underlying thinking – same geographical coordinates, similar biomes, same recipe for intervention.

The programme was hence set up targeting an area of about 107,000km² spread along the Nacala Corridor in the north of Mozambique (PROSAVANA-PD 2013). Institutions from the three partner countries were mobilised to implement it jointly. The Ministry of Agriculture of Mozambique would host the programme, and ABC and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) would represent the governments of Brazil and Japan, respectively.

Figure 1. *Cerrado-savannah parallels.*



Source: LEITE and SILVA (2013).

The programme originally foresaw two stages: the first focused on research and planning and the second concerning public and private investment (KUMASHIRO and PAIVA 2011: 11-12). The ongoing research and planning stage comprises three projects:

- The Project for Improving Research and Technology Transfer Capacity (ProSAVANA-PI). This was initiated in 2011 and runs until 2016. It entails the development and transfer of agricultural technology. Planned activities include piloting improved food and cash crop varieties (including beans, maize, wheat, rice, cotton and soybeans) at demonstration units, experimenting improved cultivation and soil conservation

techniques, and strengthening the operational capacity of IIAM (GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE et al. 2013b).

- The Project for Support of the Agriculture Development Master Plan (ProSAVANA-PD). This was developed between 2012 and 2014. It comprised the formulation of an agricultural development plan aiming to ‘contribute to social and economic development by engaging private investment to promote sustainable production systems and poverty reduction in the Nacala Corridor Region’ (GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE et al. 2013c).
- The Project for Establishment of Development Model at Communities’ Level with Improvement of Rural Extension Service (ProSAVANA-PEM). It covers the period 2013-2019 and entails the definition of ‘agricultural development models’ for increasing production in the region and improving access to and quality of extension services available to farmers in targeted areas (GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE et al. 2013d).

Besides the coordination function performed by ABC, a role played jointly with the Government of Mozambique and JICA, other Brazilian institutions involved include Embrapa and the consultancy arm of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, FGV Projetos. Other institutions came on board for the implementation of ProSAVANA-PEM (c.f. section 4.3).

Project inputs comprised a mix of in-kind technical assistance and donations and monetary grants. The Brazilian government’s contribution consisted of in-kind technical cooperation exclusively, whereas Japan also offers grants. Brazilian technical cooperation had, at the start at least, two main types of contribution: the tropical agricultural technology know-how of Embrapa, under ProSAVANA-PI, and the agricultural development and investment planning credentials of FGV Projetos, the main intellectual source for the conceptualisation of the Master Plan. FGV Projetos had built specific expertise on bioenergy production in 12 countries, of which 6 were in Africa, as part of the Brazil-USA technical cooperation agreement to develop bioenergy in the tropical belt. It had also conducted a feasibility study on biofuels and food production in Mozambique under the framework of a technical cooperation agreement between the European Union and Brazil.²⁵ This work allowed FGV Projetos to develop a methodology for agricultural investments that could be applied to different countries in the tropical belt (CAMPOS and MATOS 2012).²⁶ This

²⁵ ABC’s choice of FGV Projetos in a competitive bidding process is said to have resulted from the relevant expertise FGV had built through two initiatives (interview with FGV respondent 1, São Paulo, July 2014).

²⁶ This work consisted of identifying suitable agro-ecological zones (considering agro-climatic, edaphic and environmental characteristics) for bioenergy production, and following a ‘development clusters’ rationale, propose suitable crops and necessary investments, infrastructure and regulatory framework (Senatore and Matos 2012).

methodology was used in the conceptualisation of the ProSAVANA Master Plan (MINAG et al. 2013).

FGV Projetos was also been involved in the management of another initiative equally targeting the Nacala region, the Nacala Fund. This was a privately-managed investment fund that was officially launched in mid-2012 in Brasília, and was presented at the time as a tripartite initiative of the governments of Brazil, Japan and Mozambique, aligned with the ProSAVANA programme (FGV 2012). Specifically, the ProSAVANA Master Plan was seen as ‘the guideline of Nacala Fund’ (SENATORE and MATOS 2012: 49) and the ProSAVANA programme as a whole was perceived as the ‘institutional package’ for reducing the risk of investment in the region (SENATORE and MATOS 2012: 58). About US\$2bn were set to be raised to finance agriculture production projects in the Nacala region (FGV PROJETOS undated). Roberto Rodrigues, head of GV Agro and former Minister of Agriculture,²⁷ present at the launch of the fund, noted:

Several countries are interested in achieving Brazilian know-how in terms of production, transfer the Brazilian knowledge in agribusiness and experience with Procerrado and Prodecer programs, because we have more knowledge on the production of tropical cultures than any other country. And Africa is interested in making local economies more dynamic and investments possible, in order to reduce the dependence on the import of fossil fuels and food. (FGV 2012: 2)

Despite the original two-stage roadmap (KUMASHIRO and PAIVA 2011), which foresaw a second investment stage, the connection between public and private initiatives around ProSAVANA had in the meantime become a contested issue due to growing concerns about land grabbing and corporate penetration (as discussed in the following subsection). Hence, over time, the official narrative has become one of downplaying direct links between ProSAVANA, a governmental development cooperation programme, and business affairs targeting the region, including the Nacala Fund.

By the time fieldwork for this study was concluded, in August 2014, implementation was most advanced for ProSAVANA-PI, for which studies and training had taken place and crop adaptation experiments were ongoing. A draft of the Master Plan had been completed but had not yet, as discussed below, been officially released due to mounting controversy.²⁸ As for ProSAVANA-PEM, little was known about concrete activities on the ground. As result of growing discontent with the programme, it had become increasingly difficult to obtain information about the programme’s progress from those directly involved in implementation.

²⁷ GV Agro is FGV’s agribusiness centre and Roberto Rodrigues is widely regarded as the ‘godfather’ of corporate agribusiness in Brazil.

²⁸ It was finally released in March 2015 as a ‘Zero Draft’ by the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture (MASA 2015).

The uprising against ProSAVANA

The suggestion made by the Minister of Agriculture of Mozambique during an official visit to Brazil in 2011 that his country had cheap available land to offer to Brazilian farmers (CAMPOS MELLO 2011) raised alarm bells around ProSAVANA, at a time when land grabbing was becoming a hot topic in international development (Bush et al. 2011). The inspiration in Prodecer and the *Cerrado* (MOURÃO 2011) also fuelled concerns about the type of agricultural transformation envisaged for Mozambique. The claim that Prodecer transformed Brazil's barren *Cerrado* into the country's highly productive breadbasket (HOSONO and HONGO 2012) was contrasted with the view that the experience, particularly the focus on large-scale grain production, especially of soybeans, with high use of agrochemicals and machinery, produced negative environmental impacts and reinforced social inequalities as well as income and land concentration (CLEMENTS and FERNANDES 2013; FEARNSSIDE 2001). The presence of large Brazilian companies in the Nacala region, the establishment of the Nacala Fund and the leadership of FGV Projetos in the conceptualisation of the Master Plan, with backing from GV Agro and Roberto Rodrigues, reinforced worries about the link between ProSAVANA and the promotion of corporate agribusiness in northern Mozambique (SCHLESINGER 2014; FUNADA-CLASSEN 2013; CLEMENTS and FERNANDES 2013).

Concerns over land dispossession, labour exploitation, environmental degradation, food insecurity, social exclusion and vulnerability were raised by Mozambican civil society organisations through public statements released since 2012 (e.g. JUSTIÇA AMBIENTAL! 2013; UNAC 2012). These concerns intensified with the version of the ProSAVANA Master Plan leaked to the public in early 2013 (MINAG et al. 2013), which was read as confirming the parallelism with modes of production found in the *Cerrado* and consolidated the view that ProSAVANA was 'simply a business plan for the corporate takeover of agriculture in Mozambique' packaged as a development aid programme (JUSTIÇA AMBIENTAL! et al. 2013).

The articulation between Mozambican civil society organisations and their likeminded regional and international social movements, facilitated by Via Campesina, raised the scale and profile of the social contestation. Links with Brazilian and Japanese social organisations, specifically, helped build a foundation for the criticism, drawing directly on the *Cerrado* and Prodecer experiences and the knowledge held by Brazilian and Japanese social movements.

Following this social mobilisation, criticism of ProSAVANA also echoed inside the Brazilian government, albeit with varying tone. Some, particularly those with some links to the programme, pointed to accountability gaps and poorly managed communication with

local communities, with resulting misunderstandings about the nature of the programme.²⁹ More assertive perspectives condemned ProSAVANA as a model of the past, unsuitable to address the challenges facing Mozambican smallholder agriculture and therefore in need of change.³⁰

However, inside the Brazilian government, civil society mobilisation against ProSAVANA was also criticised for being partial and ideologically driven by a particular network of Brazilian civil society. For example:

I believe that [what is behind the ProSAVANA contestation] is the same that is behind the contestation from these movements that support landless workers, family farming, here in Brazil. It is a political rather than a technical question. It is a battle for political space (Embrapa respondent 3, Brasília, November 2013).

The extent to which these protesting movements represented local Mozambican communities' views was also questioned.

A response to the civil society uprising against ProSAVANA came in the form of stakeholder meetings in Mozambique and the publication of a Concept Note on the Master Plan as a basis for dialogue (PROSAVANA-PD 2013). The note attempted to highlight the programme's inclusion of all categories of producers, particularly small to medium farmers,³¹ and eliminate concerns about land grabbing and environmental negligence.³² It was attacked, however, on a number of issues, including the proposed end to fallow land and shifting agriculture as the main premise for improving productivity and the suggestion of contract farming between small producers and agribusiness companies for viable market development, both disputed as working against the interests of local communities (LANDGRAB-JAPAN 2013).³³ Furthermore, the unsuccessful materialisation of stakeholder engagement suggested in the Concept Note (PROSAVANA-PD 2013), combined with silence on the Master Plan that took until 2015 to be officially released to the public, led to an escalation of the contestation movement, as illustrated by the 'No to ProSAVANA!' campaign (UNAC et al. 2014).

²⁹ Interview with ABC respondent 1 (Brasília, November 2013), Instituto Lula respondent 1 (São Paulo, November 2013), and Embrapa respondent 3 (Brasília, November 2013).

³⁰ Interview with MDA respondent 1 (Brasília, November 2013).

³¹ For example: 'the target of ProSAVANA covers all categories of agriculture producers that work in the area: according to their scale of production, being small, medium and large farmers; type of agricultural management, being single farmer, farmers' organisation and commercial agriculture; and gender' (PROSAVANA-PD 2013, 1). 'The target beneficiaries of the master Plan implementation are the small and medium size farmers of the Nacala Corridor' (Ibid, 15).

³² For example: 'it is necessary to ensure the sustainability of regional agriculture through an adequate use of natural resources and agricultural land, taking care of the environment, socio-economic aspects, and paying maximum consideration to protecting the rights of local inhabitants over the use of those resources' (Ibid, 2).

³³ UNAC respondents 1 and 2 (Maputo, February 2014) confirmed this view.

Competing narratives

The controversy around the Master Plan made the discursive battle on the type of agricultural development model envisaged for Mozambique a very visible matter. In this battle for meaning, at least three stylised narratives can be differentiated.

One is the original narrative portraying ProSAVANA as the replication of the *Cerrado* transformation in Africa, and foreseeing high returns to Mozambican agriculture through the export of grains to international markets. This was the view on ProSAVANA expressed in documents and public declarations pre-dating the civil society mobilisation. The inspiration from the *Cerrado* is explicit, as is the focus on grains (particularly soybeans) and international markets (especially Asian) as highlighted in the FGV perspective (SENATORE and MATOS 2012: 55). This narrative stopped being used as the official government line, as the contestation movement had given rise to sensitivities and to more careful wording about the programme. Yet, it continued being voiced in business spaces outside the domain of development cooperation.³⁴

A second narrative, verbalised by the contestation movement, accused ProSAVANA of corporate takeover, compromising social and environmental sustainability and food security, and undermining virtuous family farming. The agribusiness model focused on high-value crops for export markets was expected to generate an uneven distribution of benefits to the disadvantage of poor local communities and small farmers. This stance found empirical backing in the accounts about the negative social and environmental legacy of the *Cerrado* development in Brazil (FERNANDES et al. 2012; MAZZETTO SILVA 2009; PIRES 2007; OLIVEIRA 2005; FEARNESIDE 2001). It was supportive of a family-farming alternative and highly disapproving of agribusiness, seen as destructive of family farming:

Agribusiness destroys what there is of more precious in family farming. And that food that should be healthy becomes contaminated, not in the hands of the farmer who planted it, but in the hands of the other that explores it in a different way. (CSO respondent 3, Brasília, November 2013).

This narrative was reproduced by those directly involved in the contestation movement, mainly from civil society organisations and social movements. But it was also reproduced inside the Brazilian government, and specifically among MDA and Embrapa staff.³⁵ For example:

There is no family farming component in ProSAVANA, full stop. That is not the model [envisaged]. (Embrapa respondent 19, Brasília, July 2014)

³⁴ Participant observation at the Second Brazil-Africa Forum, in Fortaleza in August 2014, confirmed this.

³⁵ Interviews with MDA respondents 1, 3 and 4 (Brasília, November 2013), and Embrapa respondents 16, 19 and 20 (Brasília, July 2014).

Rejecting the above narratives, Brazilian actors directly involved in ProSAVANA and reacting against the contestation insisted on misunderstandings about the programme. They highlighted the Mozambican government's leadership and sovereignty in choosing development trajectories, thereby contesting the idea that a particular farming model was being pushed by Brazilian institutions, whose role was of technical input rather than political orientation.³⁶ They also emphasised the programme's food focus, and played up the programme's family farming credentials by noting MDA's involvement.³⁷ This third more moderate narrative contrasted, therefore, with the starker picture presented in earlier pronouncements, where the *Cerrado* replication and the development of high value markets had been emphasised.³⁸ This narrative rejected, however, the dualism thesis, and its demonisation of agribusiness, emphasising instead linkages between different production systems.³⁹

Unfolding discursive politics

While the controversy over ProSAVANA remained unsettled, other elements of ProSAVANA slowly moved ahead, adding nuances to the discursive interplay and revealing more on its complex political nature. Developments concerning ProSAVANA-PEM and Fundo Nacala are illustrative of an apparent reshuffle of positions within the programme. The reshuffle concerned specifically: (i) the involvement of MDA in ProSAVANA, bringing along a family farming-leaning narrative through inputs focused on technical assistance and rural extension (ATER); and (ii) the declutching of the private sector from ProSAVANA's development cooperation sphere, even if only discursively.

ProSAVANA-PEM and the rise of the ATER agenda

ProSAVANA-PEM was formally set to define and support the implementation of agricultural development models and define and implement extension methodologies for each of the models (GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE et al. 2013d). Yet, a concrete explanation of what agricultural production models were envisaged was not readily available. According to information gathered informally, however, it appears that five extension methodologies (linked to particular production systems) were being considered: community-

³⁶ Interviews with ABC respondent 1 (Brasília, November 2013) and FGV respondent 1 (S. Paulo, July 2014).

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ The mutations of government discourse on ProSAVANA and the insertion of a language more attuned to civil society demands has been discussed elsewhere (FUNADA-CLASSEN 2013).

³⁹ The Master Plan Concept Note notes, for example: 'Contract farming is (notably) essential for smallholders and farmers groups as an initial step towards becoming partners of agribusinesses, in equal terms, supplying enough quantities of good quality produce, without depending on an extensive support from the companies' (PROSAVANA-PD 2013: 18).

based transmission; extension through farmers' associations; extension through business-type cooperatives; extension via contract farming; and extension via plantation farming.⁴⁰

It remained unclear how a connection between ProSAVANA-PD and ProSAVANA-PEM would be forged, and specifically how the clusters' rational and the extension methodologies' selection and spatial distribution would become related. By the time fieldwork was conducted, the controversy created around the Master Plan had made implementing parties reluctant to connect the two projects or indeed reveal much about PEM.

Furthermore, continuity across programme components was compromised by team changes and cleavages across teams, on the Brazilian side at least. Embrapa researchers working on ProSAVANA-PI focused exclusively on crop adaptation experiments and training activities and had distanced themselves from the remaining components, particularly in the light of the Master Plan contestation.⁴¹ FGV Projetos' contract under ProSAVANA had come to an end and its agriculture sector-focused activities in Mozambique had become centred on Fundo Nacala, which FGV claimed to be a separate initiative carried out with the Government of Mozambique and unrelated to the Brazil-Mozambique development cooperation agreement. MDA was part of the new set of actors involved in PEM and was expected to play a leading role, although the ministry had not yet assumed this position unequivocally.

Brazilian civil society actors had contrasting views on MDA's involvement in ProSAVANA. Whereas some criticised it for exporting the contradictions of Brazilian agriculture⁴², others viewed it as an opportunity to reach the compromise between agribusiness and family farming that Brazil presumably managed to forge domestically.⁴³

At the time of fieldwork, MDA's terms for engagement in ProSAVANA-PEM were being discussed. MDA's contribution would reportedly focus on technical assistance and rural extension (known as ATER in Brazil) inputs. There was also the view about an approximation between MDA and Embrapa (at least parts of the two institutions) within ProSAVANA and that this reflected a trend noticeable in Brazil's agricultural politics. The element connecting the two actors concerned the creation of the National Agency for Technical Assistance and Rural Extension (ANATER), where the two were expected to play a role.⁴⁴ The leaning of parts of Embrapa towards ANATER and MDA was a hotly debated issue in Brazil. Those in favour regarded it as an opportunity to connect research with public

⁴⁰ Interview with informants comprising the Mozambican and Japanese teams working on ProSAVANA-PEM (Nampula, March 2014).

⁴¹ Interviews with Embrapa respondent 5 (Brasília, November 2013) and respondents 6 and 7 (Nampula, March 2014).

⁴² Interview with CSO respondent 2 (Brasília, November 2013).

⁴³ Interview with CSO respondent 1 (Brasília, November 2013).

⁴⁴ It was argued that Embrapa was at the time closer to MDA than MAPA. Interview with Embrapa respondent 19 (Brasília, July 2014).

policy, and specifically an ATER policy directed to family farming systems.⁴⁵ Those against it criticised the move as undermining Embrapa's neutral research agenda and putting it at the service of party politics (NAVARRO and ALVES 2014).

From this latter perspective, the MDA-Embrapa putative pairing in ProSAVANA reflected new political alliances being forged in Brazil's domestic scene, rather than contradictory moves. The future roles played by MDA and Embrapa in ProSAVANA will shed further light onto the discursive politics. Specifically, on whether a narrative of compromise will gain strength or whether there will be a more radical rupture with current thinking and the advancement of the family farming narrative centred on ATER.

Fundo Nacala and the declutching of the private sector

Developments concerning Fundo Nacala are also relevant to understand the unfolding discursive politics. The separation between business and cooperation initiatives in the Nacala Corridor, even if only discursive, could be regarded as a response to the contestation movement as well as a feature of different stage of Brazil's engagements in the region, where the nature of government-sponsored engagement moved beyond the technical cooperation sphere.

Since its launch in 2012, Nacala Fund changed considerably.⁴⁶ Changes concerned the focus of the Fund and the management of the design process. By 2014, the immediate focus of the Nacala Fund was no longer about funding agricultural production projects but rather on building a technological package in the region, comprising seeds, fertilisers and other agricultural technology. This change resulted from the recognition that 'even with cost-free land and private investment in agricultural production, Mozambique [was] not attractive with the technological package in place'⁴⁷ – that is, with the lack of suitable agricultural technology in the form of agricultural inputs and machinery and markets for such technology. Hence, a step back was taken to focus on the upstream section of the agriculture production chain. The technological package envisaged by FGV-Projetos was claimed to concern both small-scale farming and commercial agriculture and target cotton, maize, rice and soybean. Furthermore, it was part of a broader agricultural development vision for the region that foresaw connections between Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia.⁴⁸ This had no connection, however, with the work Embrapa had been doing in Mozambique, namely in

⁴⁵ Interview with Embrapa respondent 19 (Brasília, July 2014).

⁴⁶ Interview with FGV respondent 2 (telephone interview, August 2014).

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

testing varieties of Brazilian crops, such as maize, rice cotton and soybean, to local conditions in the context of ProSAVANA-PI.⁴⁹

As for design management, FGV Projetos continued to be the leading Brazilian actor working on setting up the fund and prospecting investors and creditors. Yet, it no longer worked under the umbrella of trilateral Brazil-Japan-Mozambique cooperation but in a direct partnership with the government of Mozambique with presumably no links to ProSAVANA. Criticism of ProSAVANA was acknowledged as a reason why the Brazilian and Japanese governments have grown distant from the initiative.⁵⁰

Accounts on what type of initiative the Nacala Fund had become, the connections it had with ProSAVANA, and the role and motivations for FGV's involvement are revealing of the discursive nature of the process. FGV Projetos' claimed separation between ProSAVANA and the Nacala Fund contrasts with a Mozambican government official's view that the various public and private initiatives targeting the Nacala region were all integrated and part of a 'plot' that extends beyond the corridor and Mozambique.⁵¹

ProSAVANA's priests, technicians and traders

The Embrapa researcher's 'priests, technicians and traders' framing, introduced at the start of the paper, suggests the presence of three types of positioning in the ProSAVANA debate. In his account of the experience, the Embrapa researcher views himself as a technician, distinct from those who 'preach' a particular model of agriculture development, rooted on a family farming narrative, and from those who are moved by business interests. Although caricatured, this framing is a useful reference to discuss how different motivations and views on ProSAVANA have dialogued and interacted over time.

The original conception of the programme could be read as an alignment between traders and technicians. In this formulation, narratives on Brazil's successful *Cerrado* experience and on the edaphoclimatic similarities between Brazil and Africa are used either as a basis for technological transmission – where Brazil's tropical agriculture research is seen as most suitable – or a basis for business opportunities for Brazil – where Africa is seen as the last frontier for agriculture development and Brazilian farmers as well placed to explore it due to their experience with similar crops, soils and climate.

Civil society's mobilisation against ProSAVANA represented a call for a family farming alternative to what was seen as a corporate agribusiness enterprise. The contestation to ProSAVANA prompted a dislocation of alignments, a process still unfolding and without a clear outcome. The distancing of those working on the ProSAVANA-PI

⁴⁹ Interview with Embrapa respondent 5 (Brasília, November 2013).

⁵⁰ 'with all the criticism that ProSAVANA received, the Japanese and Brazilian government grew apart [from Fundo Nacala]' (Ibid).

⁵¹ MINAG respondent 4 (Maputo, February 2014).

component, and with a typical technical fixing discourse, from the Master Plan component and indeed from the programme's overall conception, is indicative of the fading alliance between technicians and traders. The sentiment that they are 'just' technicians sent by the traders, expressed by the Embrapa researcher, is illustrative of an effort to plea innocence vis-à-vis accusations from priests (those voicing a family farming alternative) and reinstate their presumably neutral scientific credentials.

Yet, attributing the dislocation only to the uprising against ProSAVANA would perhaps be a partial interpretation. Other developments are likely to have played a role. The lack of funding from ABC to continue with some activities, including FGV Projetos' involvement in the programme, and the failure to mobilise private investors and advance with the business model for the corridor may explain the fading of the traders' narrative vis-à-vis ProSAVANA. The Nacala Fund was now the locus of the mercantile agenda. Furthermore, the advance of a more politically driven agenda inside Embrapa, reflected in the ATER process, may open ground for the family farming narrative to shape ProSAVANA. The materialisation of ProSAVANA-PEM will reveal the extent to which such discourse will actually shape the trajectory of the programme, on the Brazilian side at least.

More Food International and its discursive politics

Genesis

Brazil's More Food Programme was introduced into development cooperation as a model for replication at a landmark event focused on food security and rural development. The *Brazil-Africa Talks on Food Safety, Hunger Alleviation and Rural Development* took place in Brasília in 2010 (ABC 2010b). This high profile gathering was hosted by President Lula da Silva in his last year in office and was attended by ministers of agriculture and delegations from across Africa.⁵²

The programme was part of the list of Brazil's public policies and programmes with an emphasis on food production and food security and particularly directed to the family farming sector, presented to African countries. With this extended menu of new cooperation possibilities, the government of Brazil stimulated the expansion of cooperation activities beyond agricultural technology and training and into the realm of public policy, specifically those policies with a family farming focus and implemented in Brazil under the aegis of MDA.

⁵² Reports range from 40 to 50 countries represented at the event.

MDA was hence inaugurated into the development cooperation domain, thereby extending its reach in international affairs beyond its hitherto trade focus.⁵³

In Brazil, the More Food Programme is a credit line designed to support the mechanisation of family farms. It was introduced in 2008 at the time of the international food price crisis. Besides addressing concerns with productivity and food price vulnerability, the programme also aimed to stimulate the Brazilian manufacturing industry and act as a 'countercyclical industrial policy' (PATRIOTA and PIERRI 2013: 140) by significantly enlarging the domestic market for agricultural machinery and equipment.⁵⁴ It also offered a political opportunity to raise the family farming agenda in Brazil's agricultural policy (Ibid).

This programme attracted much interest from the African delegations present at the Brazil-Africa Talks, whose countries suffered from productivity constraints and vulnerability to food price volatility. Commitments were therefore made to replicate it in five African countries: Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal and Zimbabwe.⁵⁵ More Food Africa was hence established as the African version of the programme with the approval of a concessional loan worth US\$640m⁵⁶ by the Brazilian Chamber of Commerce (CAMEX) to finance the mechanisation of African agriculture (PATRIOTA and PIERRI 2013).⁵⁷ The typology of agricultural machinery and implements available under the programme was set to be the same as that included in the Brazilian version, a typology that had been defined as suitable for Brazil's family farms.⁵⁸

Although it was the loan and the export of agricultural machinery that grabbed headlines (VALOR ECONÔMICO 2013), More Food Africa also comprised technical cooperation activities, including policy dialogue on family farming-focused policies as well as technical assistance focused on strengthening extension systems (ATER).⁵⁹

Besides inserting MDA into the range of Brazilian cooperation players, the programme introduced some new features into the cooperation portfolio. Its export finance element was a novelty, as Brazilian cooperation had until then been largely confined to in-kind technical assistance. It also brought on board a whole range of new actors. Besides MDA, as the leading specialised institution, and ABC, in its more procedural coordinating function, other institutions became involved in the operationalisation of the programme:

⁵³ MDA had, under the Lula government, become an active player in international trade fora, particularly in relation to the G20 and regional bloc Mercosur.

⁵⁴ As noted earlier, family farms in Brazil represent about 84 percent of total farming units (IBGE 2009).

⁵⁵ Dialogue with other African countries has also taken place since then, including with Cameroon, Namibia and Sudan.

⁵⁶ Corresponding to about US\$80-100m per country, to be paid in 3 tranches over 3 semesters.

⁵⁷ The lending conditions established from start are as follows: interest rate of two percent (or Libor, if this rate was below two percent at the time of approval); and 15-year term and 3-year grace period, extended to 17 and 5 years, respectively, for HIPC countries (PATRIOTA and PIERRI 2013: 141).

⁵⁸ This includes about 4,500 items. Tractors included in the programme have a power attribute of up to 170 CVs, which therefore also suit large farms.

⁵⁹ Interview with MDA respondent 4 (Brasília, November 2013).

CAMEX with its member institutions,⁶⁰ as the entity overseeing the export credit element; Banco do Brasil, as the lending agency; and the representative bodies of the manufacturing industry of agricultural machinery.⁶¹

It is also worth noting that, within MDA's institutional structure, two distinct areas participate in the programme. One is the International Advisory Office of Commercial Promotion (AIPC), a team seating directly under the Minister and with a tradition of representing MDA in international fora, pushing a family farming agenda and strengthening South-South alliances in the context of international trade. This team has a salient political profile and deals with the broad conceptualisation of the programme. The other is the Family Farming Secretariat (SAF), which is also responsible for implementing More Food in Brazil. This team is in charge with the operationalisation of the machinery component.

With such a variety of actors, the range of agendas at stake has also become more diversified, as reflected by the contrasting narratives about the programme and its motivations, as discussed below.

Protracted setting up process

Since the approval of the loan by CAMEX, in November 2010, the programme went through a lengthy process of establishing an institutional setup for implementation, both in Brazil and in partner countries. Delays in Brazil resulted not only from the absence of an appropriate legal framework for concessional lending but also, reportedly, from some resistance within government regarding the operation of this hybrid cooperation modality, which for the first time combined development cooperation with trade and hence not necessarily compatible interests and views about the process.⁶²

A breakthrough was finally made in 2013 with the creation of a specific working group for the programme within CAMEX⁶³ and the publication of an ordinance detailing the conditions for selling component (GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL 2013).⁶⁴

The programme had in the meantime been re-baptised as More Food International to account also for Cuba, which had joined the group of beneficiary countries. With Cuba on board, the programme suffered a few adjustments, including the direct negotiation (of price

⁶⁰ CAMEX is an inter-ministerial body overseeing international trade. It is headed by the Ministry of Development, Industry and International Trade (MDIC) and it includes the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the President's Office and MDA.

⁶¹ The industry is represented by three business federations: ABIMAQ, ANFAVEA and SIMERS.

⁶² Interview with MDA respondent 4 (Brasília, November 2013).

⁶³ The CAMEX working group overseeing the programme is called *Grupo Técnico Mais Alimentos Internacional* and was created in March 2013. Its technical secretariat is led by MDIC and MDA.

⁶⁴ The ordinance specifies: credentialed suppliers, selection process for the machinery and equipment, post-sale package and warranties. The post-sale package concerns training on handling the machinery/equipment, replacement of parts and other technical assistance related to the machinery/equipment.

and post-sale package) between the beneficiary countries and the industry, without the mediation of MDA or the industry representatives.⁶⁵

Besides dominating the headlines, the export credit also dominated work on the programme's activities over the four-year period it took for the institutional framework to be finalised. Some policy dialogue focused on MDA's family farming policy was, however, claimed by MDA to have taken place during technical missions undertaken by MDA into Africa, as part of the programme's formulation process.⁶⁶ The extent to which the family farming message got across was, however, questioned by the reported bias in beneficiary countries' selection towards more sophisticated machinery with dubious applicability to African small farmers, such as hydraulic excavators requested by the Mozambican government.⁶⁷ MDA tried to discourage a noticeable preference for large-scale machinery but could not impose any conditions and undermine Brazil's principle of demand-driven cooperation.⁶⁸

Competing narratives

Perspectives about the programme varied not only across institutions but also, in the case of MDA, within the same institution. Amongst those involved in the programme's implementation two contrasting narratives are noticeable: one portraying it as a business operation and another as a political instrument.

The first view was, unsurprisingly, the perspective held by those working in institutions linked to trade promotion or the manufacturing industry.⁶⁹ But the mercantile perspective also found echo inside MDA:

We have More Food under which we want to export machinery and equipment, having an interface with our industry. This is like the United States does. What is the Brazilian government proposal? What does the United States export? It exports HP computers. It exports computers. What do we want to export? We want to export agricultural technology. We don't want to export just soybeans. We want to be a reference in the next few years in exporting agricultural technology. This is what we are good at in Brazil.

[Interviewer: So is it also a commercial agenda?]

Yes, it is a commercial agenda. Not 'also', it is a commercial agenda. Our [MDA's] technical cooperation is a commercial agenda. (MDA respondent 2, Brasília, November 2013)

A contrasting view portrayed the programme, in Brazil as well as abroad, as an instrument of social reproduction of family farming. According to such view, mechanisation

⁶⁵ Interview with industry representative 2 (São Paulo, July 2014).

⁶⁶ Interview with MDA respondent 4 (Brasília, November 2013).

⁶⁷ Interview with MDA respondent 2 (Brasília, November 2013).

⁶⁸ Interview with MDA respondents 5, 6 and 7 (Brasília, July 2014).

⁶⁹ Interview with MDIC respondent (Brasília, November 2013).

was an essential step towards reducing drudgery and retaining farmers, specially the youth, in the countryside, thereby maintaining the social fabric in rural areas (the ‘territories of life’ perspective) and countering the concentration of land and capital resulting from the advance of agribusiness. The replication of the programme in Africa was a contribution to strengthening the family farming agenda and thereby supporting Africa’s development process. This perspective highlighted the political motivation of the initiative and downplayed the commercial drive:

We never imagined there would be commercial integration – we will become closer to Africa because we want to send the following to Africa. No, that has never been our vision and it is still not. Our vision is, if we are a developing country, we have the capacity to construct a trajectory, imperfect yes, but we have the capacity to build a development trajectory, to strengthen the state, to strengthen public policy, to strengthen family farming and build an institutional framework, what not. We want to help other countries so they also achieve that too.... [MDA’s relation with Africa] is an entirely political agenda (MDA respondent 1, Brasília, November 2013).

There are slight variants to the two narratives above. For example, some emphasise that More Food International is business with a legacy, in the sense that it is not a conventional sales operation but is accompanied by the transfer of know-how with a development purpose in the form of technical cooperation activities (the ATER element).⁷⁰ There is also a type of narrative that highlights the technocratic character of the programme, which bases its contribution to Africa’s agricultural development on the transfer of an appropriate technological package.⁷¹

In comparison to ProSAVANA, civil society criticism of More Food International has been relatively restrained. MDA’s family farming policies are broadly seen as a positive outcome of social contestation. Yet, the selling of tractors is regarded with reservations by some, who question the family farming credentials of the programme:

More Food is planning to send tractors to operate in large properties. Therefore, both the documents and the concrete evidence show us that what is being planned is not the support to small farming geared towards food production.... More Food articulates a good idea in theory, but it has elements linked to the export of agricultural machinery and equipment. There is a tension inside the programme concerning what kind of equipment, directed to whom, to what agriculture system, to properties of small, medium or large size? So that is the dispute. (CSO respondent 4, telephone interview, December 2013).

Unfolding discursive politics

⁷⁰ Interview with manufacturing industry respondent 2 (São Paulo, July 2014).

⁷¹ Interview with MDA respondents 2 and 3 (Brasília, November 2013).

Developments unfolding during 2014 (at the time of fieldwork) are indicative of the interplay between the above narratives, and two connected trends seem revealing of the dynamics unfolding. One is the apparent distancing between the commercial and technical cooperation elements of the programme. The other is the effort to restore the programme's family farming-based political thrust. This has happened specifically in Mozambique where MDA had also been called into ProSAVANA-PEM, as discussed earlier.

Declutching of the private sector

Having set up the institutional framework for operating the export credit component of More Food International and delivered the first shipment of machinery to Zimbabwe and Mozambique, the attention of MDA's international team (AIPC) shifted to the technical cooperation component of the programme and its protagonism in the export element was reported to have waned – partly because beneficiary countries are allowed to negotiate directly with the industry.⁷² The connection between the two components seemed hardly in place. Asked about how to make sure machinery exported was consistent with MDA's political vision and the work envisaged for the technical cooperation component (focused on ATER), the answer was that they cannot interfere in the sovereign choices of their partner countries.

There will not be a direct marriage between the machinery and the ATER activities or other Brazilian government programmes. We leave the marrying of the credit component with the other activities to the countries' discretion. There is no interference. Although MDA recommends articulation (MDA respondent 6, July 2014).

In the meantime, the sale of tractors and equipment followed its course as an export operation. Some within MDA expressed embarrassment about this as it showed the programme to be mainly about business and less about strengthening family farming in Africa.⁷³

From mechanisation to ATER and the food security agenda

In Mozambique, the technical cooperation element of the programme was in the process of being re-defined as a pilot initiative. The proposal on the table renewed emphasis on ATER, an agenda in the spotlight in Brazil.⁷⁴ It also proposed to introduce a direct link with

⁷² Interview with MDA respondents 5, 6 and 7 (Brasília, July 2014).

⁷³ Interview with MDA respondent 8 (Brasília, July 2014).

⁷⁴ As noted, the debate revolves around the battle for protagonism of the recently created National Agency for Rural Technical Assistance and Extension (ANATER) and the ongoing affair between parts of Embrapa and MDA as part of that process.

other Brazilian cooperation programmes in Mozambique with a focus on food security, such as the Africa Food Purchase Programme (PAA-Africa) and the School Feeding Programme. The reported intention was to complement Brazil's food security initiatives in Mozambique by providing ATER to farmers targeted by PAA-Africa, thereby creating a virtuous cycle connecting family farming reproduction to food security objectives, while also enhancing coherence across Brazil's cooperation activities. The coherence with the mechanisation process stimulated by the export credit could not be guaranteed, however. The new proposal was also expected to boost the profile of PAA-Africa, which remained a confined pilot project with poor institutional engagement from the Mozambican government.⁷⁵

Differently from a typical cooperation arrangement, where ABC covers the costs with the logistics of technical cooperation activities, MDA started searching for alternative sources of funding (including, reportedly, its own) to support this effort. This not only reflected the resource shortage affecting ABC but it also indicated MDA's renewed motivation and the political thrust of the initiative. The close connection with FAO should not be disregarded in this respect. The strengthening of multilateral organisations in the fight against hunger, FAO specifically, was explicitly presented as one of the guiding principles for MDA's new technical cooperation proposal.⁷⁶ And it is worth noting that José Graziano's mandate as FAO's DG was built on his reputation as the theorist behind the Zero Hunger programme in Brazil, which eventually led to the creation of PAA.⁷⁷

More Food International's priests, technicians and traders

Although used by the Embrapa researcher as an interpretation of ProSAVANA, the priests-technicians-traders caricature is also useful to discuss the discursive interaction around More Food International.

The programme emerged at the intersection between political and business motivations, or as an alliance between priests and traders. The programme provided an opportunity to raise the political profile of family farming internationally, in the context of a bulging cooperation agenda (at the end of Lula's mandate, when the programme was launched, the expectation was that development cooperation would become increasingly prominent in Brazil's international affairs). It also offered a possibility for expanding markets for Brazil's manufacturing industry and diversifying the country's exports.

Over time, however, the alliance started to compromise the political character of the operation that motivated some actors within MDA. The 'social reproduction of family farming'

⁷⁵ Interview with MDA respondent 8 (Brasília, July 2014).

⁷⁶ Interview with MDA respondents 5, 6 and 7 (Brasília, July 2014).

⁷⁷ The recent relocation of the PAA-Africa team to FAO HQ is also indicative of FAO's interest in boosting the programme. The former head of MDA's AIPC has also moved to FAO HQ, as an adviser to the DG.

narrative started losing space to a 'trade with a legacy' narrative. The changes in context that led to the rethinking of the technical cooperation component of the programme were not only related to a declining support to the cooperation agenda (ABC's lack of resources). They also reflected a more assertive governmental approach towards business opportunities (e.g. the creation of Grupo Africa by President Dilma Rousseff). As for the Mozambican government, Ministry of Agriculture officials interviewed for this study displayed little awareness about MDA's family farming political agenda, and were rather focused on procuring farming machinery, and tractors particularly (see also CABRAL, FAVARETO, MUKWEREZA AND AMANOR 2016 for a detailed discussion on MFI and its contested nature). Meanwhile, the ProSAVANA controversy, which mobilised civil society against technicians and traders, with echoes inside Brazil's policy circles, put pressure on MDA, as the leading institution for MFI and the patron of family farming within the Brazilian government, for a less compromising approach to development cooperation and for a revival of the family farming advocacy.

If confirmed, the alliance between MFI and PAA-Africa, with its widespread acceptance within civil society and high level support (including FAO's), may offer MDA an opportunity to clarify its stake in international affairs and reaffirm the family farming political drive. The rising ATER agenda emerged in the meantime as a connector between the two initiatives (perhaps also serving MDA's interests in the domestic scene). Recent developments therefore suggest a reconfiguration of alliances and the emergence of a coalition of actors united around a family farming-food security narrative in Brazil's development cooperation. Whether this will have a spillover effect on ProSAVANA remains an open question.

Conclusion

This paper focused on Brazil's agricultural development cooperation in Mozambique. It analysed the politics of Brazilian cooperation policy-making (*how* it comes about) and explored, specifically, the role of domestic politics in shaping engagements abroad. That domestic politics have influence over international relations may be taken as a relatively intuitive premise. However, Brazil's complex agricultural domestic politics suggests that such influence should not be regarded as part of a unitary strategy followed by the Brazilian state. Brazilian cooperation happens, instead, through a set of disjointed interactions involving a variety of players who dispute visions of agriculture domestically and of cooperation abroad, as reflected by the experiences of ProSAVANA and More Food International in Mozambique.

The choice of ProSAVANA and More Food International as case studies served to explore, in the first instance, whether the two programmes represented prototypes of the

claimed 'agrarian dualism'. The two programmes emerged from distinct political processes, and although they may mirror the institutional divide found in Brazil's agricultural governance they do not necessarily represent the poles of a paradigmatic dispute. The evidence analysed in this paper indicates that the two projects became sites of discursive battles and that dualism stands in itself for a particular perspective on the debate. Equating ProSAVANA and More Food International to two rival models of agriculture would therefore mean adopting the notions of agribusiness and family farming uncritically and simplifying the more complex dynamics that are going on.

ProSAVANA may have started as an alliance between technicians and traders and opposed by proponents of a family farming alternative. The alternative, voiced by civil society organisations and social movements, is more attuned with a 'territories of life' ontology of the rural sphere, emphasising farming as a way of living and promoting diversity of the natural and social landscape, than the version of family farming that MFI has so far managed to reproduce through the focus on machinery. The latter is better geared to fulfil a business purpose (of expanding markets for Brazilian manufacturers) than the political rationale centred on state support to family farms.

As currently set, MDA's cooperation programme seems therefore far from representing an antipode of ProSAVANA's productivist modernisation thrust. Instead of standing in dialectical opposition to each other, the two projects are each of them sites for discursive battles. The family farming-agribusiness divide stands for one particular framing of reality in those battles, rather than being an indisputable feature thereof.

Both programmes are in flux. While Fundo Nacala and the export component of MFI have grown seemingly more independent from the Brazilian government's hand, a coalition of government and civil society actors have attempted to connect the two programmes around a technical assistance/rural extension (ATER) focus. This holds the potential of strengthening the family farming narrative in development cooperation. It is worth asking, however: in the light of Brazil's domestic setting where the notion of family farming is also contested (CABRAL et al. 2016), what particular understanding of agriculture and the rural sphere will be reinforced under a broader family farming discourse coalition?

Furthermore, how significant would the strengthening of a family farming narrative in Brazilian cooperation really be, given other developments concerning Brazil's agricultural engagements in Mozambique? Civil society activism *vis-à-vis* development cooperation in Mozambique may have played a part in the reconfiguration of the programmes. It may be that, as the Brazilian government is increasingly pressured to clarify its position *vis-à-vis* development cooperation, certain discursive alliances that served the initial internationalisation drive for many actors become harder to sustain. Yet, recent changes to the programmes may also be an expression of a further stage of implantation of Brazilian

interests in Mozambique. Could it be that the apparent demarcation between Brazil's development cooperation and business initiatives (noticeable for both programmes) is now happening because the former has already served the purpose of clearing the way to the latter, rather than being an accomplishment of the social mobilisation?

References

- ABC. Projeto de Apoio Técnico aos Programas de Nutrição e Segurança Alimentar de Moçambique, Brasília, Brazil: Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2011.
- ABC. BRA04/044-BRA-EUA Agricultura: Projeto de Suporte Técnico À Plataforma de Inovação Agropecuária de Moçambique, Brasília, Brazil: Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2010a
- ABC. Diálogo Brasil-África em Segurança Alimentar, Combate À Fome e desenvolvimento Rural, Brasília, Brazil: Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2010b
- ABREU, F. J. M. de. A evolução da Cooperação Técnica Internacional no Brasil/The evolution of international technical cooperation in Brazil. **Mural Internacional**, 4(2), 3–16, 2013.
- AfDB, OECD and UNDP (2014) African Economic Outlook: Mozambique 2014. http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Mozambique_EN.pdf.
- ARRAES, P. P.; MARTHA JR., G.B.; SANTANA, C. A. M.; ALVES, E. The Development of Brazilian Agriculture: Future Technological Challenges and Opportunities', **Agriculture & Food Security**, 1(1):1-12, 2012.
- BUAINAIN, A. M.; ALVES, E.; SILVEIRA, J. M. da; NAVARRO, Z. Sete Teses Sobre O Mundo Rural, **Revista de Política Agrícola**, XXII(2):105-121, 2013.
- BURGES, S. W. Brazil as a Bridge between Old and New Powers?, **International Affairs**, 89(3):577-94, 2013.
- BUSH, R., BUJRA, J. and LITTLEJOHN, G. (2011). The Accumulation of Dispossession, **Review of African Political Economy**, 38(128):187-192
- CABRAL, L. (forthcoming) 'Brazil's contested agronomy for Africa: insights from Embrapa's knowledge encounters in Mozambique', mimeo
- CABRAL, L., FAVARETO, A., MUKWEREZA, L. and AMANOR, K. (2016) Brazil's Agricultural Politics in Africa: More Food International and the Disputed Meanings of "Family Farming", **World Development**, 81 (May): 47-60.
- CABRAL, L. and SHANKLAND, A. (2013) Narratives of Brazil-Africa Cooperation for Agricultural Development: New Paradigms? **FAC Working Paper**, 51, Brighton, UK: Future Agricultures Consortium

CABRAL, L., RUSSO, G. and WEINSTOCK, J. Brazil and the Shifting Consensus on Development Co-Operation: Salutory Diversions from the “Aid-Effectiveness” Trail?, **Development Policy Review**, 32(2):179-202, 2014.

CAMPOS, C. and MATOS, M. Brazil Technology Transfer of Know-How and Knowledge through the Economic-Financial-Technical Feasibility Studies to Produce Biofuel and Food in Mozambique, presented at the Global South-South Development Expo 2012: Investing in Energy and Climate Change – Inclusive Partnerships for Sustainable Development, Vienna, Austria: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2012.

CAMPOS MELLO, P. Moçambique Oferece Terra à Soja Brasileira, **Folha de S. Paulo**, caderno Mercado, publicado em: 14 ago. 2011. Disponível em: www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/mercado/me1408201102.htm.

CASTRO, E. (Org.). **Anuário Brasileiro da Agricultura Familiar 2013**. Erechim, Brazil: Editora Bota Amarela, 2013.

CHICHAVA, S., DURAN, J., CABRAL, L., SHANKLAND, A., BUCKLEY, L., LIXIA, T. and YUE, Z. Chinese and Brazilian Cooperation with African Agriculture: The Case of Mozambique. **FAC Working Paper**, 49, Brighton, UK: Future Agricultures Consortium, 2013.

CLEMENTS, E. A.; FERNANDES, B. M. Land Grabbing, Agribusiness and the Peasantry in Brazil and Mozambique, **Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy**, 2(1): 41-69, 2013.

DE FRANÇA, C. G., DEL GROSSI, M.; MARQUES, V. **O Censo Agropecuário 2006 e a Agricultura Familiar no Brasil**. Brasília, Brazil: Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário, 2009.

EMBRAPA. **Paralelos: Corredor de Nacala. Campinas: Embrapa Monitoramento por Satélite**. São Paulo, Brazil: Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária, 2010.

FAVARETO, A. Interrogating the Success of Brazilian Agricultural Development. **FAC Working Paper**, draft paper, Brighton, UK: Future Agricultures Consortium, 2014a

FAVARETO, A. Um contraponto à tese da ‘Argentinização’ do desenvolvimento rural no Brasil’. BUAINAIN, A. M., ALVES, E; NAVARRO, Z. (Org.). **O Mundo Rural no Brasil do Século 21: A Formação de um Novo Padrão Agrário e Agrícola**, Brasília, Brazil: Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária: 1101-1124, 2014b.

FAVARETO, A. The Misconceived Notion of a Successful Brazilian Agriculture and Some Difficulties to Endogenize an External Model presented at the Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in Africa International Conference, 18-20 March, Pretoria, South Africa, 2013.

FEARNSIDE, P. M. Soybean Cultivation as a Threat to the Environment in Brazil, **Environmental Conservation**, 28(1): 23-38, 2001.

FERNANDES, B. M., WELCH, C. A.; GONÇALVES, E. C. **Políticas Fundiárias no Brasil: Uma Análise Geo-Histórica da Governança da Terra no Brasil**. Rome, Italy: International Land Coalition, 2012.

FGV. FGV Projetos and GV Agro Launch the Nacala Fund in Brasília, **FGV News**, 11 July / 2012. Disponível em: fgvnoticias.fgv.br/en/news/fgv-projetos-and-gvagro-launch-nacala-fund-brasil

FGV PROJETOS (undated) Nacala Corridor Fund, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: FGV Projetos

FUNADA-CLASSEN, S. **Analysis of the Discourse and Background of the ProSAVANA Programme in Mozambique**: Focusing on Japan's Role, Tokyo, Japan: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 2013.

GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL. **Portaria MDA Nº 65 DE 05/08/2013**, Brasília, Brazil: Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário, 2013. Disponível em: www.legisweb.com.br/legislacao/?id=257254

GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL. Implantação de Bancos Comunitários de Sementes Crioulas em Áreas de Agricultura Familiar: Moçambique, África do Sul e Brasil, Brasília, Brazil: Secretaria-Geral da Presidência da República, sem data.

GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE, JICA and ABC (2013a) O que é o ProSAVANA, Maputo, Mozambique: ProSAVANA, 2013a. Available: www.ProSAVANA.gov.mz/index.php?p=pagina&id=27

GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE, JICA and ABC. ProSAVANA-PI, Maputo, Mozambique: ProSAVANA, 2012b. Available: www.ProSAVANA.gov.mz/index.php?p=pagina&id=8

GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE, JICA and ABC. ProSAVANA-PD, Maputo, Mozambique: ProSAVANA, 2013c. Available: www.ProSAVANA.gov.mz/index.php?p=pagina&id=9

GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE, JICA and ABC. ProSAVANA-PEM, Maputo, Mozambique: ProSAVANA, 2013d. Available: www.ProSAVANA.gov.mz/index.php?p=pagina&id=10

GRAZIANO DA SILVA, J. Estrutura Fundiária e Relações de Produção no Campo Brasileiro, paper presented at **II Encontro Nacional da ABCP**. Águas de São Pedro, Brazil: October, 1980.

HEGG, P. Brazilian Sudanese Agribusiness Company, presented at the Segundo Fórum Brasil-África, 28-29 August, Fortaleza, Brazil, 2014.

HOSONO, A. and HONGO, Y. **Cerrado Agriculture: A Model of Sustainable and Inclusive Development**, Tokyo, Japan: JICA Research Institute, 2012.

IBASE (2006) **Relatório Pronaf**: Resultados da Etapa Paraná, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas. Available: www.ibase.br/userimages/pub_pronaf_final4.pdf

IBGE. **Censo Agropecuário 2006. Agricultura Familiar. Primeiros Resultados: Brasil, Grandes Regiões e Unidades da Federação**, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. Available: www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/economia/agropecuaria/censoagro/agri_familiar_2006/familia_censoagro2006.pdf

JICA and ORIENTAL CONSULTANTS. Preparatory Study on Triangular Cooperation Program for Agricultural Development of the African Tropical Savannah among Japan, Brazil and Mozambique (ProSAVANA JBM), Tokyo, Japan: Japan International Cooperation Agency and Oriental Consultants, 2011.

JICA, ABC and GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE. Memorandum de entendimento sobre a cooperação triangular para o desenvolvimento da agricultura das savanas tropicais em Moçambique, Tokyo, Japan: Agência de Cooperação Internacional do Japão, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação and República de Moçambique, 2009.

JØRGENSEN, M. and PHILLIPS, L. J. **Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method**, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002. Available www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0658/2002102284-d.html

JUSTIÇA AMBIENTAL. Justiça Ambiental /FOE Mozambique's Position on the ProSAVANA Program, **JA4change**, 2013. Available ja4change.wordpress.com/2013/01/28/justica-ambientalfoe-mozambiques-position-on-the-ProSAVANA-program/

JUSTIÇA AMBIENTAL! ET AL. Joint Statement: Leaked Copy of the Master Plan for the ProSAVANA Programme in Northern Mozambique Confirms the Worst, **GRAIN**, 2013.

KUMASHIRO, T. and PAIVA, F. Tropical Savannah Agriculture Development Program. Japan-Brazil-Mozambique Triangular Cooperation: A Case Supported by Collaborative Agricultural Research, presented at the **First G20 Conference on Agriculture Research for Development: Promoting Scientific Partnerships for Food Security**, 12 September, Montpellier, France, 2011. Available www.egfar.org/events/g20-conference-agricultural-research-development-montpellier-france-12-13092011

LACLAU, E. and MOUFFE, C. **Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics**, London, UK: Verso, 1985.

LANDGRAB-JAPAN. Japanese Experts' Analysis: "The Concept Note for Formulation of Agricultural Development Master Plan in the Nacala Corridor", **Farmlandgrab.org**, published: 20 December 2011. Available farmlandgrab.org/post/view/22964

LEITE, J. B. and SILVA, H. **Programa Embrapa Moçambique**, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Embrapa, 2013.

MALAMUD, A. A Leader without Followers? The Growing Divergence Between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy, **Latin American Politics and Society**, 53(3):1-24, 2011.

MASA. Plano Diretor para o Desenvolvimento Agrário do Corredor de Nacala em Moçambique. Ministério da Agricultura e Segurança Alimentar (MASA), 2015.

MAZZETTO SILVA, C. E. **O Cerrado em disputa: apropriação global e resistências locais**. Série Pensar o Brasil e Construir o Futuro da Nação, Brasília, Brazil: Conselho Federal de Engenharia, Arquitetura e Agronomia, 2009.

MDA. **Um Novo Brasil Rural. Ministério Do Desenvolvimento Agrário 2003-2010**, Brasília, Brazil: Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário, 2010.

MINAG. **Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento do Sector Agrário (PEDSA): 2009-2018**. Ministry of Agriculture, Mozambique, 2011.

MINAG, DPAs; FGV; ORIENTAL CONSULTANTS Co. Ltd.; NTC International Co. Ltd. and Task Co. Ltd. **Support Agriculture Development Master Plan in the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique (PROSAVANA-PD)**. Report No.2: Quick Impact Projects, Maputo, Mozambique: Ministério da Agricultura, 2013.

MORRIS, M.; BINSWANGER-MKHIZE, H. P. and BYERLEE, D. **Awakening Africa's Sleeping Giant: Prospects for Commercial Agriculture in the Guinea Savannah Zone and Beyond**, Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2009.

MOURÃO, J. **Programa de Cooperação Triangular para o Desenvolvimento Agrícola das Savanas Tropicais de Moçambique (ProSAVANA-JBM)**. Brasília, Brazil: Divisão de Cooperação Triangular e Programas Sociais, JICA Brazil, 2011.

NAVARRO, Z. A agricultura familiar no Brasil: entre a política e as transformações da vida econômica. **A Agricultura Brasileira: Desempenho, Desafios, Perspectivas**. Brasília, Brazil: Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada and Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento, 185-209, 2010.

NAVARRO, Z. and ALVES, E. Os novos desafios da Embrapa. O **Estado de S. Paulo**, published 20 August 2014, available opiniao.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,os-novos-desafios-da-embrapa-imp-,1546563

NAVARRO, Z. and PEDROSO, M. T. Agricultura Familiar: É preciso mudar para avançar. **Texto Para Discussão** 42, Brasília, Brazil: Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária, 2011.

NOGUEIRA, I. and OLLINAHU, O. **From Rhetoric to Practice in South-South Development Cooperation: A Case Study of Brazilian Interventions in the Nacala Corridor Development Program**, Geneva, Switzerland: Institute of Socioeconomics, University of Geneva, 2013.

NOGUEIRA, P. (2013) Terra em Transe: capital estrangeiro avança sobre áreas agrícolas. **Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra**, published 10 April 2013, available www.mst.org.br/Terra-em-transe-capital-estrangeiro-avanca-sobre-areas-agricolas

OLIVEIRA, A. U. BR-163 Cuiabá-Santarém: Geopolítica, Grilagem, Violência e Mundialização. OLIVEIRA, A. U. ET AL. **Amazônia Revelada: os descaminhos ao longo da BR-163**. Brasília, Brazil: Câmara Brasileira do Livro, 67-184, 2005.

ONDEI, V. Entrevista – Gilson Pinesso. **Dinheiro Rural**, n. 107, September 2013. Available revistadinheiorural.terra.com.br/secao/entrevista/entrevista-gilson-pinesso

PAA. About PAA-Africa. **PAA-Africa: Purchase from Africans for Africa**, 2013. Available paa-africa.org/about/general-information-2/

PATRIOTA, T. C. and PIERRI F. M. Brazil's Cooperation in African Agricultural Development and Food Security. CHERU, F.; MODI, R. (Org.). **Agricultural Development and Food Security in Africa**, London, UK: Zed Books, 125-144, 2013.

PEREIRA, P. A. A.; MARTHA JR., G. B.; SANTANA, C. A. and ALVES, E. The Development of Brazilian Agriculture, Future Technological Challenges and Opportunities, in **Brazilian Agriculture Development and Changes**, Brasília, Brazil: Embrapa Studies and Training, 13-42, 2012.

PIERRI, F. M. How Brazil's Agrarian Dynamics Shape Development Cooperation in Africa, **IDS Bulletin**, 44(4):69-79, 2013.

PINHEIRO, L. and MILANI, C. **Política Externa Brasileira: As Práticas da Política e a Política das Práticas**, Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2012.

PINO, B. A. Brazilian Cooperation: A Model under Construction for an Emerging Power, Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2010.

PINO, B. A. and LEITE, I. C. O Brasil e a cooperação Sul-Sul: contribuições e desafios, **Meridiano**, 47(113):18-19, 2009.

PIRES, M. O. Programas Agrícolas na Ocupação do Cerrado, **Sociedade e Cultura**, 3(1), 2007.

PROSAVANA-PD. Elaboração Do Plano Director Do Desenvolvimento Agrícola No Corredor de Nacala: Nota Conceitual, Maputo, Mozambique: ProSAVANA-PD, 2013.

RÁDIO NACIONAL. Entrevista: Embrapa Vai Lançar Base Avançada Em Moçambique, Diz Campanhola, **Revista Brasil**, published 16 January 2005.

SCHLESINGER, S. **Brazilian Cooperation and Investment in Africa: The Case of ProSAVANA in Mozambique**. TEMTI Series of Economic Perspectives on Global Sustainability, Gland, Switzerland: International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policies, 2014.

SENATORE, G. and MATOS, M. **Agricultural Investment in Africa: Brazilian Expertise to Promote Sustainable Agriculture Investments**, Presentation, *Dakar*, 6 November 2012.

SILVA, J. G. Os Desafios Das Agriculturas Brasileiras. **A Agricultura Brasileira: Desempenho, Desafios, Perspectivas**, Brasília, Brazil: Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada and Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento, 2010.

SOARES DE LIMA, M. R. and HIRST, M. Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities, **International Affairs**, 82(1):21-40, 2006.

STOLTE, C. Brazil in Africa: Just another BRICS Country Seeking Resources? **Chatham House** – The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2012.

TEIXEIRA, G. As Dívidas e a Dúvida para a Agricultura Familiar. **MST - Agricultura Camponesa**. Publicado em: 28 jul. 2011. Disponível em: <https://www.cptne2.org.br/index.php/publicacoes/noticias/noticias-do-campo/2981-as-dividas-e-a-duvida-para-a-agricultura-familiar.html>. Acesso em: ago. 2014.

UNAC (2012) Land Grabbing for Agribusiness in Mozambique: UNAC Statement on the ProSAVANA Programme, Maputo, Mozambique: União Nacional de Camponeses Moçambique / viacampesina.org/en/index.php/main-issues-mainmenu-27/agrarian-reform-mainmenu-36/1321-land-grabbing-for-agribusiness-on-mozambique-unac-statement-on-the-ProSAVANA-programme

UNAC ET AL. No to ProSAVANA! Launch of National Campaign, **Farmlandgrab.org**, published 2 June 2014, available farmlandgrab.org/post/view/23577

UNAC, VIA CAMPESINA and GRAIN. Brazilian Agribusiness Invades Africa, **Farmlandgrab.org**, published 30 November 2012, available farmlandgrab.org/post/view/21363

VALE. Almoço de Fim de Ano Da Diretoria Da Vale Com a Imprensa, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Vale, 2013.

VALOR ECONÔMICO. Exportação Do Mais Alimentos Sai Em 2014, **Valor Econômico**, published 16 December 2013, available www.valor.com.br/agro/3372432/exportacao-do-mais-alimentos-sai-em-2014

VALOR ECONÔMICO. Embrapa Vai Pesquisar O Genoma Da Soja Em Parceria Com Chineses', **Globo Rural**, 227, 2004.

VIGEVANI, T. and CEPALUNI, G. Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification, **Third World Quarterly**, 28(7):1309-1326, 2007.

VISENTINI, P. **Prestige Diplomacy, Southern Solidarity or "Soft Imperialism"?** Lula's Brazil- Africa Relations (2003 Onwards), paper presented at African Studies Centre, Leiden, Netherlands: April 7 2009.

WHEATLEY, J. Brazilian Farms Sow Seeds of Openness, **Financial Times**, published 14 April 2010.

Recebido para publicação em 05 de maio de 2016.

Aceito para a publicação em 01 de maio de 2017.